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IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS  
AT MURFREESBORO 
 
MARK WELCH, ) Docket No.: 2015-05-0340 
Employee, )  
v. ) State File Number: 39263-2015 
FRITO-LAY, INC., )  
Employer, ) Judge Dale Tipps 
And )  
AGRI GEN. INS. CO. )  
Insurance Carrier/TPA. )  
 )  
 
EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL BENEFITS 
 
 
This matter came before the undersigned workers’ compensation judge on March 
3, 2016, on the Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the employee, Mark Welch, 
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2015).  The present focus of 
this case is the compensability of Mr. Welch’s right shoulder injury and his entitlement to 
medical benefits.  The central legal issue is whether the evidence is sufficient for the 
Court to determine that Mr. Welch is likely to establish at a hearing on the merits he 
suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment.  
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Mr. Welch is entitled to the requested 
medical benefits.
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History of Claim 
 
 Mr. Welch is a fifty-three-year-old resident of Giles County, Tennessee.  He 
testified he worked as a truck driver for Frito-Lay for twenty-two days when he suffered 
a work injury to his right shoulder on April 28, 2015.  He also testified he never had any 
prior problems with his right shoulder.  In addition, he passed numerous DOT physicals.   
 
On April 28, 2015, while Mr. Welch was unloading boxes from a trailer, a box fell 
from the top of the stack.  He caught the box with his right hand over his head and pushed 
it off to one side.  While doing this, another box fell and struck the first box, jerking his 
arm down, and causing him to drop both boxes.  He felt a sharp pain in his shoulder and 
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 A complete listing of the technical record and exhibits admitted at the Expedited Hearing is attached to this Order 
as an appendix. 
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saw a knot in his bicep area.  Mr. Welch reported the injury to his supervisors, and Frito-
Lay provided on-site treatment with the plant nurse for several weeks.  It subsequently 
provided a medical panel from which Mr. Welch selected Dr. Derek Riley.  (Ex. 6.) 
 
 Dr. Riley first saw Mr. Welch on May 20, 2015, for complaints of right bicep pain.  
Mr. Welch reported a box falling and pulling his arm on April 28, 2015.  His pain was 
mainly at the right elbow.  Dr. Riley noted a possible partial biceps rupture and ordered 
an MRI.  Mr. Welch returned on June 8, 2015, stating he had severe pain with flexion.  
The pain was worse at his elbow, but he felt it extended up his arm.  The MRI showed 
“distal biceps edema but intact.”  Dr. Riley diagnosed biceps tendon strain.  (Ex. 4.) 
 
 On June 29, 2015, Mr. Welch returned to Dr. Riley, reporting that his elbow had 
improved, but his shoulder had worsened.  Dr. Riley ordered an MRI of the shoulder, 
which showed a rotator cuff tear and a long head biceps rupture.  Dr. Riley discussed 
surgery with Mr. Welch on July 20, 2015, and recommended surgical repair on August 
12, 2015.  He noted: 
 
It is unlikely that a[n] intact RTC without underlying pathology would tear 
from what was reported to me on paper as “lifting a 5-7 pound box.”  He 
describes verbally the event as being from catching a falling box, which 
would increase the force across his shoulder.  He does describe being 
symptom free before this event and symptomatic beginning with the event.  
I am unable to say with certainty that the event in question caused > 51% of 
his pathology, however I cannot say that it absolutely did not.  It may be of 
benefit for him to get a second opinion on this matter. 
 
Dr. Riley also noted Frito-Lay informed Mr. Welch it would not pay for any shoulder 
procedure “as he had underlying pathology prior to his injury.”  Id. 
 
 Mr. Welch testified that, because Frito-Lay was denying his medical treatment, he 
went to see Dr. William Ledbetter on September 22, 2015.  Dr. Ledbetter’s records show 
he did not treat Mr. Welch on that date because he needed to confirm whether the 
workers’ compensation carrier would cover his treatment.  Mr. Welch returned on 
October 2, 2015, with complaints of right shoulder pain.  Dr. Ledbetter noted: 
 
Injured on the job April 28, 2015, approximately 5 months ago.  Seen by an 
orthopaedic surgeon.  He initially had an MRI scan of his right elbow.  This 
demonstrated an injury to the biceps tendon.  Due to persistent problems 
which then became more significant about the shoulder, he then had an 
MRI scan of his right shoulder, which demonstrated rotator cuff tear.  This 
has been denied by Workmen’s Comp.  He has now been let go by the 
company.  Previously was on light duty.  Underwent a course of physical 
therapy.  No other specific treatment that he described.  He reports no major 
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problems with his right shoulder prior to his injury.  
 
Dr. Ledbetter diagnosed a complete tear of the right rotator cuff.  He told Mr. Welch he 
no long performs surgery and recommended a consultation with an orthopedic surgeon.  
(Ex. 3.) 
 
 Mr. Welch returned to Dr. Ledbetter on November 3, 2015.  Dr. Ledbetter 
recorded a detailed history of Mr. Welch’s condition and treatment, including a 
description of the April 28, 2015 accident.  After examining Mr. Welch and reviewing his 
imaging results, Dr. Ledbetter stated: “It is my opinion that there is greater than 50% 
likelihood that his rotator cuff tear and rupture long head biceps tendon occurred as a 
result of his on-the-job injury.  I recommend surgical repair.”  Dr. Ledbetter reiterated 
this opinion in his office note of December 28, 2015.  Id. 
 
 In response to a request from Frito-Lay’s attorney, Dr. Riley signed an undated 
letter stating: “The biceps tendon and the rotator cuff are intricately related.  The injuries 
likely have the same underlying cause but I am unsure if >51% of the pathology was 
from this specific incident.  I think it would be worthwhile for your claimant to seek a 
second opinion.”  (Ex. 5.) 
 
Mr. Welch filed a Petition for Benefit Determination seeking medical benefits.  
The parties did not resolve the disputed issues through mediation, and the Mediating 
Specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice.  Mr. Welch filed a Request for Expedited 
Hearing, and this Court heard the matter on March 3, 2015.   
 
At the Expedited Hearing, Mr. Welch asserted he is entitled to medical treatment 
for a rotator cuff tear arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his 
employment.  He acknowledged he selected Dr. Riley from a panel offered by Frito-Lay, 
but he disputed Frito-Lay’s interpretation of Dr. Riley’s conclusions.  Mr. Welch 
contended Dr. Riley, when asked about causation, was unable say whether or not Mr. 
Welch’s work caused his torn rotator cuff or biceps tendon rupture.  In other words, the 
authorized treating physician (ATP) in this matter has not given any causation opinion at 
all.  In the absence of any such opinion, Mr. Welch argued Dr. Ledbetter’s opinion 
establishes the required causal link.  Consequently, he requested an order compelling 
Frito-Lay to authorize the recommended surgery.  In the alternative, Mr. Welch requested 
an order for a second opinion with an authorized physician, as recommended by Dr. 
Riley. 
 
Frito-Lay countered that Mr. Welch is not entitled to any workers’ compensation 
benefits because he failed to present evidence his injury arose primarily out of and in the 
course and scope of his employment.  It argued there are two causation opinions in this 
case and, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14)(E) (2015), Dr. 
Riley’s opinion is presumed to be correct.  Frito-Lay characterized Dr. Riley’s opinion as 
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his conclusion that catching a box of potato chips was unlikely to be the cause of Mr. 
Welch’s injuries.  Frito-Lay also contended Dr. Ledbetter gave a summary opinion 
without any explanation, which is insufficient to overcome the presumption of 
correctness attached to Dr. Ledbetter’s opinion. 
 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
 
Because this case is in a posture of an Expedited Hearing, Mr. Welch need not 
prove every element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain 
relief.  McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. 
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015).  
Instead, he must come forward with sufficient evidence from which this court might 
determine he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.  Id.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
239(d)(1)(2015).  In analyzing whether he has met his burden, the Court cannot construe 
the law remedially or liberally in his favor, but instead shall construe the law fairly, 
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring 
neither Mr. Welch nor Frito-Lay.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2015). 
 
During the hearing, the parties stipulated to notice and the date of injury.  With the 
exception of a dispute over the weight of the boxes involved,
2
 Mr. Welch’s description of 
the accident was unrebutted.  Thus, the primary issue is whether Mr. Welch’s injury is 
compensable. 
 
To prove a compensable injury, Mr. Welch must show that his alleged injury arose 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-
6-102(14) (2015).  To do so, he must show his injury was caused by an incident, or 
specific set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 
50-6-102(14)(A) (2015).  Further, he must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that it contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement 
or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
102(14)(C) (2015).  “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in 
the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as 
opposed to speculation or possibility.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D) (2015). 
 
Frito-Lay is correct that, because Mr. Welch selected Dr. Riley from a panel of 
physicians, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14)(E) (2015) establishes a 
rebuttable presumption of correctness for any causation opinion given by Dr. Riley.  
Frito-Lay contends Dr. Riley “concluded it is unlikely that Mr. Welch tore his rotator cuff 
and ruptured his bicep tendon while catching a box of potato chips.”  The Court finds, 
however, that Dr. Riley has not given a causation opinion in this matter.  Rather, he 
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 Mr. Welch testified each of the boxes weighed five to seven pounds.  Frito-Lay introduced the affidavit of Jarrius 
Salter, who stated the boxes weighed 3.4 pounds each. 
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stated, “I am unable to say with certainty that the event in question caused > 51% of his 
pathology, however I cannot say that it absolutely did not.”  He later said, “I am unsure if 
>51% of the pathology was from this specific incident.  I think it would be worthwhile 
for your claimant to seek a second opinion.”  The simplest and most straightforward 
reading of these statements together shows that Dr. Riley was unable or unwilling to give 
a clear opinion regarding the cause of Mr. Welch’s injury. 
 
Even if the Court credited Dr. Riley’s statements as a causation opinion, those 
statements would be legally insufficient because they fail to utilize the correct legal 
standard for causation.  As noted above, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
102(14)(C) (2015) requires an employee seeking benefits to prove, “to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that [incident] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in 
causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.”  
(emphasis added)  Dr. Riley’s “opinion,” on the other hand, questioned whether more 
than 51 percent of Mr. Welch’s pathology came from his work accident.3  To the extent 
Dr. Riley gave an opinion, it was based on an incorrect legal standard.  Therefore, the 
Court does not afford it any weight. 
 
Much like Dr. Riley, Dr. Ledbetter did not specifically utilize the phraseology of 
the causation definition in the statute, but his record differs from Dr. Riley’s statements in 
two important respects.  First, unlike Dr. Riley, Dr. Ledbetter clearly gave his opinion as 
to the cause of Mr. Welch’s injuries, stating, “there is greater than 50% likelihood that 
[Mr. Welch’s] rotator cuff tear and rupture long head biceps tendon occurred as a result 
of his on-the-job injury.”  Second, a close reading of this statement shows that it satisfies 
the applicable legal standard, even though it does not specifically cite the language of the 
statute. 
 
The statute requires physicians to give their opinion based upon a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty.  “‘Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty’ means 
that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all 
causes as opposed to speculation or possibility.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D) 
(2015).  Dr. Ledbetter’s “greater than 50% likelihood” meets this requirement, as it is 
simply another way of expressing “more likely than not.” 
 
What Dr. Ledbetter felt “more likely than not” is that Mr. Welch’s condition 
“occurred as a result of his on-the-job injury.”  It is not determinative that the doctor did 
not couch this opinion in terms of “arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of 
his employment,” as the wording of his statement indicates his belief the on-the-job 
injury was, not just the primary cause, but the sole cause of Mr. Welch’s shoulder and 
arm condition.   
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 The Court recognizes this is a slender distinction, but the statute is quite specific that the legal standard is more 
than fifty percent.  The one percent difference is not immaterial. 
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Frito-Lay presented evidence that the boxes involved in Mr. Welch’s accident 
weighed less than four pounds each, rather than the five to seven pounds alleged by Mr. 
Welch.  Although not specifically argued, the implication appears to be Frito-Lay’s belief 
that these lightweight boxes could not be the cause of Mr. Welch’s injuries.  Any such 
conclusion would constitute a medical opinion, and would be a matter for the doctors to 
address. The Workers’ Compensation Law does not allow the Court to substitute its 
medical opinion, or that of Frito-Lay, for the professional opinions of trained medical 
professionals. 
 
Frito-Lay also contended the Court should not afford Dr. Ledbetter’s opinion any 
weight.  It argues he summarily gave his causation opinion without any explanation.  The 
Court finds this argument unpersuasive.  Dr. Ledbetter saw Mr. Welch multiple times, 
took a relatively detailed history, and reviewed Mr. Welch’s imaging studies and Dr. 
Riley’s treatment notes.   Dr. Ledbetter then issued his causation opinion after noting Mr. 
Welch reported no injury or significant problems with his right shoulder before the 
workplace accident.  There is no indication Dr. Ledbetter was unaware of any relevant 
history or imaging studies.  The Court finds no reason to exclude his opinion as 
unreliable. 
 
As noted above, the only medical causation opinion in the record is that of Dr. 
Ledbetter.  In the absence of any actual medical opinion to the contrary, the Court finds 
Mr. Welch appears likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.  Therefore, as a matter of 
law, Mr. Welch has come forward with sufficient evidence from which this Court 
concludes that he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.  His request for medical 
benefits is granted.  
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
 
1. Medical care for Mr. Welch’s injuries shall be paid and Frito-Lay or its workers’ 
compensation carrier shall provide Mr. Welch with medical treatment for these 
injuries as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 (2015), to 
include any surgical repair recommended by Dr. Riley, who remains the 
authorized treating physician.  Medical bills shall be furnished to Frito-Lay or its 
workers’ compensation carrier by Mr. Welch or the medical providers. 
 
2. This matter is set for an initial (scheduling) hearing on May 5, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. 
 
3. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, 
compliance with this Order must occur no later than seven business days 
from the date of entry of this Order as required by Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3) (2015).  The Insurer or Self-Insured 
Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the 
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Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the 
seventh business day after entry of this Order.  Failure to submit the 
necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a 
penalty assessment for non-compliance. 
 
4. For questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers’ Compensation 
Compliance Unit via email WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov or by calling (615) 
253-1471. 
 
ENTERED this the 14th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
_____________________________________  
    Judge Dale Tipps 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims 
 
Initial (Scheduling) Hearing: 
 
An initial (scheduling) hearing has been set with Judge Dale Tipps, Court of 
Workers’ Compensation Claims.  You must call 615-741-2112 or toll free at 855-
874-0473 to participate. 
 
Please Note:  You must call in on the scheduled date/time to 
participate.  Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without 
your further participation.  All conferences are set using Central Time (CT).   
 
 
Right to Appeal: 
 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order 
to appeal the decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.  To file a Notice of 
Appeal, you must:  
 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: “Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal.” 
 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the 
date the Workers’ Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order. 
 
3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party.  
 
4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00.  Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment 
must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment.  Payments can be 
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made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or 
other delivery service.  In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit 
of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing 
fee.  The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice 
of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter.  The Appeals Board 
will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying 
the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is 
practicable.  Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of 
Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
 
5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal, 
may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the 
purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it 
with the Court Clerk within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited 
Hearing Notice of Appeal.  Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of 
the evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing 
Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and 
accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers’ Compensation 
Claims and must be approved by the workers’ compensation judge before the 
record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board. 
 
6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory 
appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within 
five business days of the expiration of the time to file a transcript or statement of 
the evidence, specifying the issues presented for review and including any 
argument in support thereof.  A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if 
any, with the Court Clerk within five business days of the filing of the appellant’s 
position statement.  All position statements pertaining to an appeal of an 
interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement summarizing the facts of the 
case from the evidence admitted during the expedited hearing; (2) a statement 
summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of the expedited hearing; (3) a 
statement of the issue(s) presented for review; and (4) an argument, citing 
appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Exhibits: 
1. Affidavit of Mark Welch 
2. Affidavit of Jarrius Salter 
3. Records of Dr. William Ledbetter 
4. Records of Dr. Derek Riley 
5. Letter from Dr. Riley to Frito-Lay’s attorney 
6. Bureau forms. 
7. Photographs of shipping boxes 
 
Technical record:4 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination  
2. Dispute Certification Notice 
3. Request for Expedited Hearing 
 
  
                                                 
4
 The Court did not consider attachments to Technical Record filings unless admitted into evidence during the 
Expedited Hearing.  The Court considered factual statements in these filings or any attachments to them as 
allegations unless established by the evidence. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order 
Granting Medical Benefits was sent to the following recipients by the following methods 
of service on this the 14th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Via 
Fax 
Via 
Email 
Service sent to: 
Eric Hennessee, Esq. 
 
  X Eric.hennessee@mitchellattorneys.
com 
John Lewis, Esq. 
 
  X john@johnlewisattorney.com 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
_____________________________________ 
    Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 
 
